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EXTRATERRITORIAL DISCOVERY: A SOCIAL
CONTRACT PERSPECTIVE
I. INTRODUCTION
The basic philosophy of the U.S. system of discovery is that jus-
tice is best served when, prior to trial, litigants in a civil action fully
disclose all information potentially pertinent to the claim at issue.'This idea is embodied in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1):
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged,
which is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending ac-
tion, whether it relates to the claim or defense of the party seeking
discovery or to the claim or defense of any other party, including
the documents, or other tangible things and the identity and loca-
tion of persons having knowledge of any discoverable matter. The
information sought need not be admissible at the trial if the infor-
mation sought appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discov-
2
ery of admissible evidence.
Most restrictions upon this broad right to discovery pertain to
the permissible use of information and to the amount presumptively
discoverable without a showing of need, rather than to what particu-
lar information may be discovered at all.3 The purpose of broad pre-
trial discovery is to better prepare parties and to make trial less a bat-
tle of wits and more of a focused, surprise-free search for truth based
on narrow issues and access to all relevant facts.4
When evidence to be discovered is located outside the United
1. See Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947) ("Mutual knowledge of all the rele-
vant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper litigation. To that end, either party
may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts he has in his possession.").
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
3. See R. LAWRENcE DEssEM, PRETRIAL LITIGATION: LAW, POLICY, & PRACI'ICE 227
(1996); 8 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 2001 (1970).
4. See United States v. Proctor & Gamble, 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) ("Modem instru-
ments of discovery serve a useful purpose .... They, together with pretrial procedures, make a
trial less a game of blind man's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts dis-
closed to the fullest practicable extent."). It is also hoped that broad discovery will promote
settlement, as each party will fully know the other's case and thus be better able to evaluate
accurately the strength of its own case. See, ag., DESSEM, supra note 3, at 204.
298 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 7:297
States, courts may request the assistance of foreign judicial authori-
ties to obtain the information via the Hague Convention on the Tak-
ing of Evidence Abroad.! Prior to this convention, such formal re-
quests for foreign assistance were considered the only available
recourse to obtain the information. This was so because of the "strict
territorial" view of sovereignty, a doctrine which limited the ability of
countries to take action outside their borders.' This strict view has
since been replaced by the "effects principle", which grants a nation
authority to take extraterritorial actions in response to the conduct of
anyone outside its territory which produces effects within the nation's
borders. Applying the effects principle to extraterritorial discovery,
if a U.S. court finds that it has personal jurisdiction over a party, that
court may, solely upon its own authority, order the party to produce
evidence pursuant to U.S. law regardless of location of the evidence!
The use of formal requests for assistance remains an option, but is
generally disfavored because such requests are time consuming, ex-
5. See Hague Convention on The Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, entered into force for the United States Oct. 7,
1972, 23 U.S.T. 2555, 847 U.N.T.S. 241. For commentary on the Hague Convention, see GARY
B. BORN & DAVID WESTIN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES COURTS:
CASES AND MATERIALS 411-47 (2d ed. 1992). See also Gary B. Born & Scott Hoing, Comity
and the Lower Courts: Post-Aerospatiale Applications of the Hague Evidence Convention, 24
INT'L LAW. 393 (1990); Joseph F. Weis, Jr., The Federal Rules and the Hague Conventions:
Concerns of Conformity and Comity, 50 U. PIrr. L. REV. 903 (1989).
6. For enunciation of the strict view of sovereignty, see The Schooner Exchange v.
McFaddon, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812); American Banana v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347
(1909) ("The foregoing considerations would lead, in case of doubt, to a construction of any
statute as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the territorial limits over which
the lawmaker has general and legitimate power.").
In Societ6 Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States District Court for the
Southern District of Iowa, 482 U.S. 522, 538 (1987), the non-producing party used the strict ter-
ritorial view to argue that the United States could conduct extraterritorial discovery only via
the Hague Convention procedures. The U.S. Supreme Court disagreed, holding that direct
discovery remains an option, but that courts should "exercise special vigilance to protect for-
eign litigants." Id. at 546.
7. For enunciation of the effects principle, see United States v. Aluminum Co., 148 F.2d
416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) ("[A]ny state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its borders which a
state reprehends .... ).
The effects principle was adopted by the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RE-
LATIONS LAW OF TIE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS].
8. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442(1)(a) (1987). See, e.g., In re Ura-
nium Antitrust Litig., 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1145 ("Once personal jurisdiction over the person and
control over the documents by the person are present, a U.S. court has the power to order pro-
duction of the documents. The existence of a conflicting foreign law which prohibits the disclo-
sure of the requested documents does not prevent the exercise of this power.").
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pensive, and much less certain to be successful.9
Unfortunately, such "direct" discovery by U.S. courts is not well
received by the rest of the world.' The primary explanation for this
resistance is that the U.S. system of broad discovery is fundamentally
different from that of most foreign countries. Most other countries
fiercely limit the scope of discovery to protect personal privacy and
consider U.S. discovery to be a "fishing expedition."'1 It is this fun-
damental opposition to broad discovery that prevents indirect meth-
ods of extraterritorial discovery such as the Hague Convention from
being effective: If a foreign country believes that the information
sought is beyond the scope of proper discovery, it is under no obliga-
tion to provide access to it and generally will not allow disclosure.
The problem is further exacerbated because most other countries do
not even recognize the legitimacy of direct extraterritorial discovery,
but instead regard it as a violation of their sovereignty and territorial
integrity.12
In order to restrict the use of direct discovery, many foreign na-
tions have adopted "blocking statutes" that create civil and penal
sanctions prohibiting compliance with U.S. discovery orders. These
blocking statutes take three basic forms: 4 (1) laws prohibiting disclo-
sure of particular types of information; 5 (2) laws prohibiting compli-
ance with foreign discovery orders without government approval; 6
9. See, ag., BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 348-49; Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 542.
10. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 422, Reporters' Note 1 (1987)
("[No aspect of the extension of the American legal system beyond the territorial frontier of
the United States has given rise to so much friction as the request for documents in investiga-
tion and litigation in the United States.").
11. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 349-50; see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442.
12. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 350; see also INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSO-
CIATION, REPORT OF THE FImrY-FIRST CONFERENCE 407 (1964) ("It is difficult to find any
authority under international law for the issuance of orders compelling the production of
documents from abroad.").
13. See generally Paul A. Batista, Confronting Foreign "Blocking Legislation": A Guide to
Securing Disclosure from Non-Resident Parties to American Litigation, 17 INT'L LAW. 61, 63-72
(1983).
14. See BORN & WESTIN, supra note 5, at 371-72. There is also a fourth category, con-
taining laws pre-dating the direct discovery controversy which also have the effect of blocking
the production of information. Id. See, e.g., Swiss bank secrecy laws such as The Swiss Penal
Code, CODE PENALSUISSE [CP] art. 273 (1971) (Switz.).
15. For laws prohibiting the disclosure of information, see, e.g., Uranium Information Se-
curity Regulations, R.S.G. 1976-2368 (1976) (Can.); Shipping Contracts and Commercial
Documents Act (1964) (Eng.).
16. See, e.g., (Law No. 80-538 of July 16, 1980) JOURNAL OFFICIEL DE LA REPUBLIQUE
FRANcAISE [J.0.] (relating to the communication of economic, commercial, industrial, finan-
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and (3) laws giving governmental agencies power to forbid compli-
ance with specified foreign discovery orders. When these blocking
statutes and U.S. discovery orders come into conflict, dueling notions
of sovereignty and of the appropriate level of judicial truth-seeking
violently clash, usually to the disservice of innocent litigants.
For almost fifty years, the U.S. judiciary has tried with little suc-
cess to find a resolution to the extraterritorial discovery conflict.
This Note surveys the evolution of U.S. law in this area and argues
using the political theory concept of social contract that current U.S.
law fails to achieve both its stated goal of balancing U.S. and foreign
interests and its implicit goal of pursuing equal justice for all litigants.
Essentially, U.S. courts' attention in this matter has been misplaced-
the courts have attempted to maintain good foreign relations, a field
which should be the province of the executive branch, instead of con-
centrating on enforcing U.S. law as embodied in broad discovery.
Regardless of its merits, broad discovery is the method the United
States has chosen as the best way to pursue justice. If broad discov-
ery is the standard in purely domestic cases, why should it not also be
the standard in cases involving parties with foreign connections who
have fully availed themselves of all the other benefits of U.S. law? If
uniform enforcement of broad discovery is not conducive to U.S. for-
eign relations, the problem should be resolved not by the courts, but
by the executive branch.
II. CONFLICT BETWEEN DIRECT DISCOVERY AND
BLOCKING STATUTES: A CRITICISM OF U.S. LAW
U.S. law has used two approaches to deal with the blocking stat-
ute problem: First, the comity analysis, whereby, when confronted
with a foreign blocking statute, U.S. courts refuse to order discovery,
motivated by strict territorial notions of sovereignty and fears of re-
taliation; and later, the balancing analysis, whereby courts weigh
various factors to decide whether or not to exercise their power to
order discovery.18 Although the comity approach increasingly has
cial or technical documents or information to foreign natural or legal persons). For an English
translation with commentary, see 75 AM. J. INT'L L. 382 (1981).
17. See, e.g., British Protection of Trading Interest Act, 1980, ch. 11, secs. 1-4 (Eng.), re-
printed in 21 I.L.M. 834 (1982).
18. See generally Lenore B. Browne, Note, Extraterritorial Discovery: An Analysis Based
on Good Faith, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1320, 1330-35 (1983); David E. Teitelbaum, Note, Strict
Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 38 STAN. L. REV. 841, 856-74 (1986); Note, Beyond
the Rhetoric of Comparative Interest Balancing: An Alternative Approach to Extraterritorial
Discovery, 50 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 95, 97-105, Summer 1987 [hereinafter Beyond the
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been replaced by a balancing analysis, the comity approach has not
disappeared. Neither approach, however, adequately protects both
U.S. sovereignty and the U.S. interest in broad discovery.
A. Prior Law: Comity
The comity approach was first developed by the Second Circuit
in a line of cases from the late 1950s. 9 Generally, the principle of
comity requires sovereign states to uphold the domestic laws of all
other sovereign states without inquiry into the substance of the laws
themselves. 2 It is based on reciprocity but is not limited by it. Ulti-
mately, comity is little more than a hope that other countries will
choose to respect U.S. laws.2'
In the context of direct extraterritorial discovery, the comity ap-
proach demands that the United States demonstrate its respect for
foreign laws by refusing to order direct discovery abroad when com-
pliance with such an order would lead to the violation of a foreign
law.' The Second Circuit extended comity to its logical conclusion
Rhetoric]; Daniela Levarda, Note, A Comparative Study of U.S. and British Approaches to Dis-
covery Conflicts: Achieving A Uniform System of Extraterritorial Discovery, 18 FORDHAM
INT'LL.J. 1340, 1366-72 (1995).
19. See First Nat'l City Bank of New York v. Internal Revenue Serv., 271 F.2d 616 (2d Cir.
1959); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149 (2d Cir. 1960); In re Application of Chase Manhattan
Bank, 297 F.2d 611 (2d Cir. 1962).
20. See, e.g., Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1894) ("[Comity] is the recognition which
one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, executive or judicial acts of another na-
tion, having due regard both to international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own
citizens or of other persons who are under the protection of its laws."); Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at
544 n.27 ("Comity refers to the spirit of cooperation in which a domestic tribunal approaches
the resolution of cases touching the laws and interests of other sovereign states.").
21. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 411 (1964) ("Although
Hilton v. Guyot [citation omitted] contains some broad language about the relationship of reci-
procity to comity, the case in fact imposed a requirement of reciprocity only in regard to con-
clusiveness of judgments, and even then only in limited circumstances."); Direction der Dis-
conto-Gesellschaft v. United States Steel Corp., 300 N.Y.S. 2d 741,747 (S.D.N.Y. 1924).
22. See First Nat'l City Bank, 271 F.2d at 619. In this case, a non-party bank refused to
produce certain records held in its Panamanian branch subpoenaed by the IRS pertinent to an
investigation of one of the bank's depositors on grounds that such production would violate
Panamanian law. The Second Circuit stated that discovery should not be ordered if production
would be illegal under Panamanian law. The court found insufficient evidence to establish that
production would in fact be a violation of Panamanian law and therefore ordered discovery.
Id.
The Second Circuit's reasoning in this case is questionable, however. For the proposi-
tion that discovery should not be ordered when compliance is illegal under foreign law, the
court cited S.E.C. v. Minas De Artensia, 150 F.2d 215 (9th Cir. 1945), which does not seem to
support it. In Minas, an Arizona corporation refused to comply with an SEC subpoena to pro-
duce documents held in Mexico on grounds that Mexican law forbade removing the documents
from the country. The lower court accepted the argument and, accordingly, granted Minas a
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by refusing to order discovery when compliance would violate the
spirit of a foreign law, if not the actual letter.2 Because there is no
guarantee that the foreign country will defer to U.S. broad discovery
laws if alternative, indirect methods are followed, the comity analysis
often resulted in foreign blocking statutes defeating the U.S. interest
in broad discovery.
Scholars have resoundingly criticized the comity analysis not
only because it. completely ignores the importance of broad discov-
ery, but also because it encourages the hiding of documents outside
the United States behind the protection of foreign laws. Further-
more, the comity analysis ignores the U.S. Supreme Court precedent
of Societ6 Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commer-
ciales v. Rogers,4 which held that the existence of a blocking statute
was not in and of itself a bar to direct discovery.' While use of the
comity analysis did quell international complaints about U.S. discov-
ery, it ultimately created just as many domestic ones.
For all of these reasons the comity analysis has fallen out of fa-
vor in recent years with most U.S. courts, including the Second Cir-
cuit.2 Nonetheless, comity-driven decisions have never been explic-
itly overruled and comity jurisprudence continues to be influential,
dismissal. The Ninth Circuit reversed, however, holding that the corporation should still be
required to make the documents available to the SEC, but that it might do so in an alternative
manner, consistent with Mexican law. Thus, despite the blocking statute, the court still ordered
the discovery. Id.
23. See Ings, 282 F.2d at 152 ("Upon fundamental principles of international comity, our
courts dedicated to the enforcement of our laws should not take such action as may cause a
violation of the laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its
procedures."), quoted in Chase Manhattan, 297 F.2d at 613. In Chase Manhattan, the govern-
ment argued that production should be ordered because compliance would not be technically
illegal. The court responded that "this would be nothing more than an attempt to circumvent
the Panamanian law. Such a maneuver scarcely reflects the kind of respect which we should
accord to the laws of a friendly foreign sovereign state." Id.
24. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
25. See Browne, supra note 18, at 1329; Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 855-56.
26. See S.E.C. v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. 111, 114 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)
(distinguishing First Nat'l City Bank, Ings, and Chase Manhattan on the grounds that they deal
with non-party witnesses); United States v. Vetco, 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 n.8 (9th Cir. 1981)
(finding that there were feasible alternative means).
The Second Circuit has since moved to a "more flexible position." See, e.g., Minpeco
v. Conticommodity Servs., 116 F.R.D. 517, 521 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Compagnie Frangaise
D'Assurance Pour Le Commerce Exterieur v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 105 F.R.D. 16, 29
(S.D.N.Y. 1984). In fact, the Second Circuit explicitly rejected the comity analysis in favor of a
balancing analysis in United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 901 (2d Cir. 1968)
("Mechanical or overbroad rules of thumb are of little value; what is required is a careful bal-
ancing of the interests involved and a precise understanding of the facts and circumstances of
the particular case.").
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appearing not only in dicta, but also in applications of the current
balancing analysis.'
B. Current Law: Balancing Analysis
Societj Internationale v. Roger? was the first U.S. case to em-
ploy a balancing analysis to uphold a discovery order despite the exis-
tence of a foreign blocking statute. The case involved a claim by a
Swiss holding company against the United States for the return of
property seized by the United States during World War II under the
Trading with the Enemy Act.29 At issue was whether the Swiss hold-
ing company was sufficiently connected with a German corporation
to make the Swiss company an "enemy national" within the meaning
of the Act. Seeking information on this issue, the U.S. government
moved for discovery of the Swiss company's bank records. The Swiss
company protested, claiming that production would violate Swiss law.
Despite the ultimate production of many documents by the Swiss
company, a dismissal for non-compliance was nonetheless entered by
the lower court?3
On appeal the U.S. Supreme Court reversed and remanded the
case for further consideration on the proper sanction in light of the
Swiss company's good faith attempts to comply. In coming to this
conclusion, the U.S. Supreme Court reevaluated whether the district
court should have ordered production in the first place by balancing
three factors: (1) the chances of flexibility by the foreign state in ap-
plication of its statute; (2) the U.S. interest in the Trading with the
Enemy Act; and (3) the importance of the information to the litiga-
27. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 825 F.2d 494,498 (D.D.C. 1987) ("We do not here decide
the general issue of whether a court may ever order action in violation of foreign laws, although
we should say that it causes us considerable discomfort to think that a court of law should order
a violation of law, particularly on the territory of the sovereign whose law is in question."),
quoted in In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Marsoner v. United States) 40 F.3d 959, 967 (9th Cir.
1994) (Pregerson, J., dissenting) (adding, "[I]ikewise, it might also be an affront for a United
States court to compel an action, which is performed in the United States but has ramifications
in a foreign country, in an attempt to circumvent the laws of that foreign country").
28. 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
29. Procedurally, the Swiss company was the plaintiff, but the U.S. Supreme Court consid-
ered its position more analogous to a defendant because "it belatedly challenges the Govern-
ment's action by now protesting against seizure and seeking the recovery of assets which were
summarily possessed by the Alien Property Custodian ...." Rogers, 357 U.S. at 210.
30. Societ6 Intemationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciaes v. McGran-
ery, 111 F. Supp. 435, 443-47 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd sub. nom. Societ6 Internationale Pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958).
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tion." The Court concluded that despite the fact that the Swiss com-
pany would be liable for criminal sanctions, discovery was properly
ordered because of the important U.S. policy behind the Trading
with the Enemy Act and the fact that the information would have a
"vital influence upon this litigation."
32
This balancing test has since been expanded and codified in two
versions of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States.3 The test's purpose is to reach some sort of accommodation
between U.S. discovery and the need for international comity, rather
than simply yielding outright to foreign pressure as the comity analy-
sis prescribed.3
The majority of courts perform this balance when considering
whether to make the initial order of discovery. However, a distinct
minority, relying on Rogers, delay any considerations of balancing
factors until the party has refused to comply with a discovery order
and a motion for sanctions has been made.35 Nonetheless, under both
31. Rogers, 357 U.S. at 204-05.
32. Id.
33. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40 (1965) includes the following
factors:
(a) the vital national interests of each of the states;
(b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions
would impose upon the person;
(c) the extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the
other state;
(d) the nationality of the person; and
(e) the extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be ex-
pected to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
Furthermore, according to the Third Restatement:
In deciding whether to issue an order directing production of information located
abroad, and in framing such an order, a court or agency in the United States should
take into account the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or
other information requested; the degree of specificity of the request; whether the in-
formation originated in the United States; the availability of alternative means of se-
curing the information; and the extent to which noncompliance with the request would
undermine important interests of the United States, or compliance with the request
would undermine important interests of the state where the information is located.
RESTATEMENT (THRuD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442(1)(c).
34. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp. Uranium Contracts Litig., 563 F.2d 992, 996-
99 (10th Cir. 1977); Arthur Andersen v. Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338, 341-42 (10th Cir. 1977);
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengellschaft v. Superior Court, Alameda County, 123 Cal. App. 3d. 840,
857 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981).
35. See, e.g., Finesilver, 546 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1977); In re Uranium Antitrust Litig., 480
F. Supp. 1138 (N.D. Ill. 1979); Laker Airways v. Pan Am., 103 F.R.D. 42 (D.D.C. 1984) (Laker
1); Lyons v. Bell Asbestos, 119 F.R.D. 384 (D.S.C. 1988); Reinsurance Co. of Am. v. Adminis-
tratia Asigurarilor de Stat, 902 F.2d 1275 (7th Cir. 1990) (Easterbrook, J., concurring); Central
Wesleyan College v. W.R. Grace, 143 F.R.D. 628 (D.S.C. 1992).
For criticism of this approach, see, e.g., SEC v. Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92
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approaches the decision whether to impose sanctions is based on a
Rogers analysis of the non-producing party's good faith, defined as
"serious efforts before appropriate authorities of states with blocking
statutes.., to secure release or waiver from a prohibition against dis-
closure"" and the absence of evidence that the party actively sought
out the blocking statute or moved the information into the country to
receive protection from the blocking statute.37  When sanctions are
imposed, they tend to be limited to the finding of facts adverse to the
38nonproducing party.
Although such a balancing analysis might seem straightforward,
it is inherently unworkable with respect to its limited goal of provid-
ing disclosure to litigants. The analysis is centered around an attempt
to impartially evaluate the relative importance of both foreign and
domestic national interests, neither of which can be objectively
measured. 39  This task is impossible for U.S. courts because, as na-
F.R.D. 111 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); Minpeco v. Conticommodity Servs. 116 F.R.D. 517 (S.D.N.Y.
1987).
For courts that bifurcate the process, the balance factors will only be considered at the
sanctions phase. See e.g., Finesilver, 546 F.2d at 341. The distinction between the majority and
the bifurcation minority is less one of actual outcome and more one of orientation: The major-
ity places the emphasis on protecting the sovereignty of the other country involved, and is
hence reluctant to offend by ordering discovery, whereas the bifurcation courts attempt to
maximize the likelihood that the U.S. litigant will actually receive the requested information by
giving the order initially and hoping for voluntary compliance. See, e.g., Civil Aeronautics Bd.
v. Deutsche Lufthansa, 591 F.2d 951, 953 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (per curiam) ("Moreover, this
court's affirmance of the enforcement order may be a factor in facilitating production of the
documents by petitioner without risking sanctions by the German Government.").
36. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442(2) (1987).
37. See Rogers, 357 U.S. at 208 ("Whatever its reasons, petitioner did not comply with the
production order. Such reasons, and the willfulness or good faith of petitioner, can hardly af-
fect the fact of noncompliance and are relevant only to the path which the District Court might
follow in dealing with petitioner's failure to comply.").
38. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442(2)(c) (1987). See also
Rogers, 357 U.S. at 212-13; General Atomic v. Exxon Nuclear, 90 F.R.D. 290 (S.D. Cal. 1981).
39. Many courts consider national interests to be the most important factor upon which
their entire analysis turns. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Proceedings (United States v. Field), 532
F.2d 404 (5th Cir. 1976).
The Rogers balance only considered the interest of the United States in the underlying
claim, but both versions of the Restatement suggest that courts determine and balance the pol-
icy interests of both countries involved. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 40
(1965); RESTATE MENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442 (1987). Courts are not in agree-
ment about what sort of national interest they are balancing. While the Restatements suggest a
balancing of the policy behind the particular law at issue in the case, some courts instead bal-
ance the more general interest of the United States in ensuring fair judgments or pursuing dis-
covery. See, e.g., In re Westinghouse, 563 F.2d at 1002 (balancing U.S. discovery rules against
foreign interest in protecting prices); Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1280 (Easterbrook,
J., concurring) (balancing the general interest of the forum state and interest in dispute resolu-
tion).
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tional tribunals, they must necessarily be partial: "National legal sys-
tems cannot provide objectivity in the international context, because
they do not regulate the relationships among states and because each
is subject to alteration by the state in which it operates."' * Further-
more, "national interest" in the sense employed by the Restatements
cannot be measured because it cannot exist apart from the nations
that create it.4 The national interest behind a statute is whatever that
nation says it is, and no other country could be in any position to de-
clare it to be anything different.42 Any analysis based on such a sub-
jective standard would be necessarily discretionary.43
Even if one assumes that national interests can be determined,
the balancing analysis still falls apart when the U.S. court is asked to
weigh the two interests to determine which is the most compelling.
By definition, the interests of equal, sovereign nations controlling ac-
tions within their own territories must necessarily be of equal
weight.' No nation is above another such that it could place national
interests into any sort of legitimate hierarchy.
Furthermore, such a balance requires political expertise beyond
the proper scope of the judiciary.45 The courts implicitly acknowledge
40. David J. Gerber, International Discovery After Aerospatiale: The Quest for an Ana-
lytical Framework, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 521, 541 n.113 (1988). See also Graco v. Kremlin, Inc.,
101 F.R.D. 503,513 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
41. The Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations §442, cmt. c, suggests that the court use ex-
pressions of interest by the state itself, the significance to regulation, and the timing of the ori-
gin of the concern to evaluate this importance. Even with these guidelines the analysis must
necessarily break down. For example, in Minpeco, the court found the Swiss bank secrecy laws
to be an important state policy because they serve the "legitimate purpose of protecting com-
mercial privacy inside and outside Switzerland." 116 F.R.D. at 524. The court then went on to
contrast the Swiss statute with French, Dutch, Canadian, Australian, and South African statutes
it declared unimportant because the court considered their true purposes to be only frustration
of U.S. discovery, which is apparently not a "legitimate purpose" for a nation to pursue. Id.
42. See Gerber, supra note 40, at 540-41.
43. Id.
44. See, eg., Uranium Antitrust, 480 F.Supp. at 1148 ("Aside from the fact that the judici-
ary has little expertise, or perhaps even authority, to evaluate the economic and social policies
of a foreign country, such a balancing test is inherently unworkable in this case. The competing
interests here display an irreconcilable conflict on precisely the same plane of national policy..
. . It is simply impossible to judicially 'balance' these totally contradictory and mutually ne-
gating actions."); Reinsurance Co. of Am, 902 F.2d at 1284 (Easterbrook, J., concurring)
(referring to national interests as "incommensurables").
45. See generally Beyond the Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 104-05. See also Laker Airways v.
Sabena et al. (Laker II), 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C.Cir. 1984) ("We are in no position to adjudi-
cate the relative importance of antitrust regulation or nonregulation to the United States and
the United Kingdom. It is the crucial importance of these policies which has created the con-
flict. A proclamation by judicial fiat that one interest is less important than the other will not
erase a real conflict.").
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this when they consider statements (or the lack thereof) by the execu-
tive branch in performing the balancing analysis.' It has been argued
that interest balancing is a violation of the political question doctrine,
i.e., the idea that courts should not adjudicate questions concerning
foreign relations when they turn on standards that defy judicial appli-
cation or involve the exercise of discretion that normally belongs to
another branch.'7 Whether or not this argument has merit, it is clear
that interest balancing takes the courts outside their normal scope of
activities.' The situation is analogous to the problem addressed by
the Act of State doctrine: Courts might be capable of determining
whether actions of foreign states are illegal under either foreign or
international law, but because of the peculiar elements of foreign re-
lations involved, such a judicial determination is not wise and should
be left up to the executive branch.49
With the exception of the importance of the information sought,
most of the balance factors are not really relevant to the inquiry. The
other factors, i.e., hardship, place of performance, nationality, speci-
ficity, origin of the information, and existence of alternative means,
are merely restatements of the issue involved in balancing national
interests. For all but hardship, the courts have explicitly stated that
these factors are less important.' But even in considerations of hard-
ship, the courts consider much the same factors as they do with na-
tional interests. How much the party asked to produce will suffer is
considered to be directly proportional to the importance of the gov-
ernmental interest in the blocking statute.51 All of these factors are
46. See, e.g., Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 523.
47. See Beyond the Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 104. For a discussion of the political ques-
tion doctrine, see Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,211,217 (1962).
48. See RESTATEmENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442, cmt. c (explaining the analy-
sis required to balance national interests).
49. See Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). In its discussion of the Act of State doctrine, the
U.S. Supreme Court concluded that the doctrine was not mandated by notions of sovereignty,
international law, or the Constitution, but "arises out of the basic relationships between
branches of government in a system of separation of powers." Id at 423. The Court further
stated that allowing the judiciary to make Act of State decisions could have negative conse-
quences on foreign policy. Id. at 423-24.
50. See, eg., Electro Design Mfg. v. Texas Instruments, No. CV 89 1843 (JMM) 1990 WL
21105 at *3; Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 522; Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 119.
51. See Alfadda v. Fenn, 149 F.R.D. 28, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1993). Courts determine whether
there is hardship based on whether the blocking statute carries mandatory criminal penalties
and whether or not it is certain to be enforced. See Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 525-526; see also
United States v. First Nat'l City Bank, 396 F.2d 897, 902 (2d Cir. 1968) (holding that civil li-
abilities suffice to show hardship).
For criticism of this determination of hardship, see Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d
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just as impossible to determine and to weigh as national interest and
thus can provide no additional assistance to the balance.
In practice the balancing analysis provides little improvement
over the comity analysis because it still defers to foreign law with its
final factor, the importance of the information sought. The com-
ments to section 442 of the Restatement (Third) suggest that before
extraterritorial discovery is ordered, the information should be
shown to be "necessary to the action-typically, evidence not other-
wise readily discoverable-and directly relevant and material,"5 2 thus
creating a heightened standard of relevancy for all requests for extra-
territorial discovery. This determination is often the decisive factor
in a balancing analysis." U.S. courts do consider the importance of
the information sought when deciding other discovery issues such as
motions for limitations on the amount of discovery to be allowed,"
claims of privilege," motions for protective orders, 7 and the creation
at 1284 (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
52. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442, cmt. a (1987).
53. See Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1146, explaining Societ6 Internationale v.
McGranery, 111 F. Supp. 435 (D.D.C. 1953), rev'd sub nom. Societd Interationale Pour Par-
ticipations Industrielles et Commerciales v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958) (holding that "the
normal discovery standard.. should be replaced by the higher standard of whether the re-
quested documents are crucial to the resolution of a key issue in the litigation").
54. See, e.g., Minpeco, 116 F.R.D. at 530 ("The significance of the factor bearing upon the
importance to the litigation of the documents and information requested for a court's decision
to order production of the information located abroad is indicated by the prominent place it
occupies in the revised balancing test contained in the newest Restatement draft [referring to
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 437(1)(c) cmt. a (tentative draft no. 7,
1986)]."); Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1154-55; United States v. First Nat'l Bank of Chi-
cago, 699 F.2d 341, 346 (7th Cir. 1983).
Although importance of the information was a factor in Rogers, it was not included in
the Restatement (Second) factors. But, because courts continued to consider it in their analyses,
the ALI added the importance of the information to the factors listed in the Restatement
(Third). See, eg., Trade Dev. Bank v. Continental Ins. Co., 469 F.2d 35,41 (2d Cir. 1972).
55. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(2) states in part that
[t]he frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods otherwise permitted under
these rules and by any local rule shall be limited by the court if it determines that: (i)
the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative, or is obtainable from
some other source that is more convenient, less burdensome, or less expensive; (ii) the
party seeking discovery has had ample opportunity by discovery in the action to ob-
tain the information sought; or (iii) the burden or expense of the proposed discovery
outweighs its likely benefit, taking into account the needs of the case, the amount in
controversy, the parties' resources, the importance of the issues at stake in the litiga-
tion, and the importance of the proposed discovery in resolving the issues."
56. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(5). Privileges do not relieve parties of the duty to generally
disclose information, but allow the withholding of certain information that falls into well-
defined exceptions based on constitutional law, statutory law, common law, and the rules of
evidence. See generally ROGER S. HAYDOCK ET AL, FUNDAMENTALS OF PRETRIAL
LITIGATION 201-13 (2d ed. 1992). Where a privilege is found, the interest behind the privilege
is considered to outweigh the interest in disclosure even if the information sought is important.
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of discovery plans.58 But there is a significant difference between
these determinations and that made in the balancing analysis: The
importance of the information in the first instance is generally con-
sidered only as a concession to practicality and the needs of litigants
to pursue cost-effective and timely discovery, but in the balancing
analysis, considering the importance of the information is a conces-
sion to foreign law, similar in effect to the comity analysis. Further-
more, the imposition of discovery limitations in these previously
enumerated areas is still guided by the principle that a litigant should
have the discovery that he or she seeks,59 whereas balancing is guided
by the principle that foreign countries should not be inconvenienced.
By requiring in the balancing analysis that the information be
"important," U.S. courts allow foreign law to dictate the scope of
U.S. law and thereby infringe upon U.S. sovereignty.60
Because all of the factors considered in the balancing analysis
are vague and indeterminate, courts cannot apply the balancing
analysis in any manner that would lead to predictable, consistent de-
cisions." For example, in In re Westinghouse Electric Corporation
Uranium Contracts Litigation,62 the majority and the dissent reached
For this reason, privileges are narrowly drawn. Id.
57. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c). The issue involved here "is not whether the court is going to
allow parties to embark upon a fishing expedition, but whether the court may make the voyage
more pleasant for those who are required to become passengers by the Rules of Civil Proce-
dure." Twin City Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. American Title Ins. Co., 31 F.R.D. 526,527 (W.D.
Mo. 1962). Protective orders prohibiting discovery are usually only issued when the discovery
was not for legitimate needs, but instead an attempt to take advantage of the discovery system.
See Schweinert v. Insurance Co. of N. Am., 1 F.R.D. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
58. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(f). This rule grants judges the discretion to develop a discovery
plan that focuses discovery on relevant issues and to impose limitations on the amount of dis-
covery that may be had.
59. See McMann v. SEC, 87 F.2d 377, 378 (2d Cir. 1937) ("The suppression of truth is a
grievous necessity at best... it can be justified at all only where the opposing private interest is
supreme.").
60. See Finesilver, 546 F.2d at 342 ("An anomalous situation with great potential effect
would result from recognition of the right of a litigant to avoid discovery permitted by local law
though the assertion of violation of foreign law. Foreign law may not control local law. It can-
not invalidate an order which local law authorizes.").
Some courts have recognized this inconsistency and have discounted the significance
of this factor accordingly. See, e.g., Fundacion Museo de Arte Contemporaneo de Caracas v.
CBI-TDB Bancaire Privee, No. 93 CIV 6870 (PKL) 1995 WL 805120 at *2 (S.D.N.Y. 1995)
("Because the documents at issue have not been produced and no convincing arguments of ir-
relevance have been offered, the court cannot conclude that they are so irrelevant as to mini-
mize the otherwise substantial interests of the United States in full disclosure."); Compagnie
Francaise, 105 F.R.D at 32 n.8 (refusing to consider anything other than whether the documents
are "relevant").
61. See Levarda, supra note 18, at 1368-70.
62. 563 F.2d 992 (10th Cir. 1977).
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opposite conclusions while supposedly balancing the same factors in
the same test. For the majority, the facts that the non-producing
party had acted in good faith, that the records were physically located
in Canada and were not crucial to the other party's defense, and that
Canada had a legitimate national interest as evidenced by the fact
that Canada had protested, outweighed any U.S. interest in
"adequate discovery."' The dissent strongly disagreed, especially
with the majority's assessment of national interests: "When the
strong underlying policy reasons in connection with the discovery
rules are pitted against the Canadian policy of protecting its local in-
dustries from insufficient prices, no real contest exists." 4 Because of
the inadequacy of the factors, the outcome of the test turned on
vague notions of sovereignty and concerns about "the long-term in-
terests of the United States generally in international cooperation in
law enforcement and judicial assistance" rather than on law."
The balancing analysis also runs into difficulty in the sanctions
phase. Sanctions are important because they send a message to the
present parties and to all potential future litigants that discovery or-
ders must be obeyed. ' But, by allowing the issuance of sanctions in
the extraterritorial discovery situation to turn on "good faith," the
court shoots itself in the foot: As long as the nonproducing party does
not purposefully deposit the information where a blocking statute
would apply in an attempt to hide the information behind it, the court
will not be able to take any significant steps to provide to rule-
abiding litigants the discovery to which they are entitled. The good
faith analysis grants so much deference to foreign blocking laws that
in ultimate effect, it is much the same as the previously rejected com-
ity analysis. 8
In an attempt to avoid some of these flaws, scholars have sug-
gested many alternatives to the current balancing approach. David
Gerber has suggested replacing the vague balance factors with what
he calls a "legal framework" to balance interests based on norms of
63. See id. at 998-99.
64. Id. at 1003 (Doyle, J., dissenting).
65. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442 cmt. c (1987).
66. Reinsurance Co. of Am., 902 F.2d at 1283 (Easterbrook, J., concurring) ("I would be
most reluctant to accept an approach that calls on the district judge to throw a heap of factors
on a table and then slice and dice to taste. Although it is easy to identify many relevant consid-
erations, as the ALI's restatement does, a court's job is to reach judgments on the basis of rules
of law rather than to use a different recipe for each meal.").
67. See National Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, 427 U.S. 639, 643 (1976).
68. See generally Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 841.
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international law.69 Gerber argues for a balance based on "objective"
standards of national interests derived from public international law
to determine which interests of states should be legally protected."
Gerber would balance the U.S. regulatory interest in discovery
weighted according to how important the information is, against the
sovereign interests of the foreign state, giving separate consideration
to fairness to the private litigants and to whether production would
violate the international law principle of noninterference.7' Gerber's
suggestion might solve the problem of the current balancing analy-
sis's vagueness, but it does not address the fact that the United States
has guaranteed to all litigants in U.S. courts an opportunity for broad
discovery, but routinely denies litigants this opportunity if they are
unfortunate enough to sue or be sued by a party with relevant evi-
dence located in a foreign country.
III. A SOCIAL CONTRACT ANALYSIS OF THE PROBLEM
Social contract theory dominated political philosophy in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries and because of its influence on the
formation of American government it remains highly relevant today,
despite current criticism and the emergence of new theories.' By
"social contract" what is generally meant is that governments and
those that they govern have reciprocal obligations resembling a con-
69. See Gerber, supra note 40, at 521.
70. See id.
71. See id.
72. See J.W. GOUGH, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT: A CRITICAL STUDY OF ITS DEVELOPMENT
229-43 (2d ed. 1957).
For specific examples of the influence of social contract theory in American govern-
ment, see, eg., Constitution of New Jersey (1776) in Constitutions of the United States (1809)
("Whereas all the constitutional authority ever possessed by the kings of Great Britain over
these colonies, or their other dominions, was, by compact, derived from the people, and held of
them for the common interest of the whole society; allegiance and protection are, in the nature
of things, reciprocal ties, each equally depending on the other, and liable to be dissolved by the
others being refused or withdrawn."); THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S.
1776):
We hold these truths to be self evident-that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That, to secure these rights, governments are in-
stituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed; that
whenever any form of government becomes destructive of these ends, it is the right of
the people to alter or to abolish it, and to institute a new government, laying its foun-
dation on such principles, and organizing its powers in such form, as to them shall
seem most likely to effect their safety and happiness.
The influence of social contract theory can also be seen in the secession controversy that cul-
minated in the Civil War. See, e.g., J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE
UNITED STATES (Boston, 1833).
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tract. The government promises to provide certain rights and protec-
tions to those it governs and in return those governed promise to
obey.? This Note takes no position on whether social contract theory
is the "correct" philosophy of government, but rather uses this well-
established idea as an analytical tool to organize some general
thoughts regarding the duties of the United States and all litigants in
its courts.
Inherent in the nature of a contract is that all who accept the
benefits conferred by the contract must necessarily become bound by
it and subject to the burdens that it imposes. Similarly, one who ac-
cepts the benefits of living under the U.S. government should be ob-
ligated to obey the U.S. government. The social contract, therefore,
would not extend exclusively to U.S. citizens, but to anyone actively
partaking in the benefits of the United States, including foreign citi-
zens and foreign corporations.74 The extent of the social contract is
roughly equivalent to the extent of personal jurisdiction in that it re-
quires some level of "minimum contacts" with the United States.75 If
a party conducts business in the United States, it is only fair that the
party should submit to all the obligations that the United States im-
poses upon those over which it governs, including the rules of discov-
ery.
6
73. See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT (1978).
74. See, e.g., Marsoner v. United States, 40 F.3d at 964 (holding that although Marsoner
was an Austrian citizen, as a United States resident whose American activities created a U.S.
tax liability he could be forced by an American grand jury to sign a disclosure directive order-
ing release of his bank records located in Austria).
75. See Asahi Metal Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102 (1987). The idea behind mini-
mum contacts is similar to the social contract, but it is sometimes argued that minimum con-
tacts are present in situations where one would be hard pressed to find that the party accepted
the benefits of the United States in any significant capacity. See id. (Brennan, J., concurring).
This disunity in jurisdictional theory may not be of great significance as long as there is some
consideration of fairness to the defendant. See id. at 115 (requiring a "careful inquiry into the
reasonableness of the assertion of jurisdiction in the particular case"). Compare RE.
STATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 403 (1987) (forbidding the exercise ofjurisdiction
when unreasonable.)
See generally Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewics, 471 U.S. 462 (1985); World-Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 (1980); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
76. See Aerospatiale, 482 U.S. at 539 n.25. In its discussion of why the Hague Evidence
Convention was not intended to provide the exclusive mechanism for extraterritorial discovery,
the Court states:
a rule of exclusivity would enable a company which is a citizen of another contracting
state to compete with a domestic company on uneven terms, since the foreign com-
pany would be subject to less extensive discovery procedures in the event that both
companies were sued in an American court. Petitioners made a voluntary decision to
market their products in the United States. They are entitled to compete on equal
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It is a fundamental principle in the United States that all people
should have an equal and fair opportunity to pursue life, liberty, and
happiness.' This idea forms the basis of the notions of due process
and equal protection, and is integral to social contract. From this
concept derives the proposition that all litigants in U.S. courts, irre-
spective of any particular ties to a foreign state, should be subject to
the same standards of procedure, including the same rules of discov-
ery. If the governed are to be expected to obey, then the government
should continue to provide all the rights that it has promised, includ-
ing equal application of the law of procedure. The United States
owes a duty to all "consenters" to the social contract to require that
parties with foreign ties produce requested information on the same
terms as domestic litigants."
While it is difficult to argue that the United States has not guar-
anteed equal application of the law, one might argue that this guaran-
tee extends only as far as the sovereignty of the U.S. government, and
that under a strict territorial view, this duty stops at the border.
However, even if one were to subscribe to this strict view, the com-
peting sovereignties at issue would balance out." Sovereignty is of-
fended when a foreign state controls actions within another state; if
the action of the United States in ordering discovery offends foreign
sovereignty, then the action of not ordering discovery because of the
foreign law must necessarily offend domestic sovereignty.
There are no theoretical impediments to the equal treatment in
terms with other companies operating in this market. But since the District Court un-
questionably has personal jurisdiction over petitioners, they are subject to the same
legal constraints, including the burdens associated with American judicial procedures,
as their American competitors. A general rule according foreign nationals a preferred
position in pretrial proceedings in our courts would conflict with the principle of equal
opportunity that governs the market they elected to enter.
See also Compagnie Francaise, 105 F.R.D. at 32 ("Plaintiffs cannot avail themselves of these
benefits, yet neglect their accompanying responsibility to disclose all relevant facts to their ad-
versary.").
77. See, eg., THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776); U.S. CONST.
amend. V; amend. XIV.
78. See Banca Della Svizzera Italiana, 92 F.R.D. at 119 ("It would be a travesty of justice
to permit a foreign company to invade American markets, violate American laws if they were
indeed violated, withdraw profits and resist accountability for itself and its principals for the
illegality by claiming their anonymity under foreign law.").
79. See Emory v. Greenough, 3 Dall. 369, 370 n.2, 1 L.Ed 640 (1797) (setting forth an ex-
tract from a treatise by seventeenth century Dutch jurist Ulrich Huber), quoted in Aerospatiale,
782 U.S. at 543 n.27 ("By the courtesy of nations, whatever laws are carried into execution,
within the limits of any government, are considered as having the same effect every where, so
far as they do not occasion a prejudice to the rights of the other governments, or their citizens.")
(emphasis added). One could argue that because deference to foreign blocking statutes would
prejudice rights granted by the United States, the foreign sovereignty would not be implicated.
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U.S. courts of all non-producing parties, both foreign and domestic.
The only real impediment is a pragmatic concern about the effect of
such orders for production on foreign relations. U.S. courts sought to
address this concern with the concept of comity, but had little suc-
cess. Foreign relations is not a proper concern for the judiciary.'
The judiciary has long acknowledged this limitation in the Act of
State doctrine.81 It is unfortunate that the judiciary refuses to accept
this limitation with regard to extraterritorial discovery.
IV. CONCLUSION: EQUAL JUDICIAL TREATMENT AND A
FOREIGN POLICY SOLUTION
This Note proposes that the only viable solution to the extrater-
ritorial discovery problem is the equal treatment of all litigants in
U.S. courts, with no preference shown to litigants with foreign con-
nections. Discovery should be ordered in international situations on
the same terms as it is in purely domestic cases. This proposal differs
from the Restatement balancing test and earlier proposals because it
refuses to consider the importance of the information sought." Most
proposals use the importance of the information as a safeguard
against unnecessary infringement upon the rights of foreign nations,'
thus assuming the interests of foreign nations are implicated when-
ever the production of information located within their territories is
ordered by a U.S. court. This proposal disagrees with that assump-
tion, disregarding the importance of the information sought, and in-
stead focuses on fairness to both parties, regarding foreign interests
in this area as limited to pursuing fair treatment for their citizens and
residents in U.S. courts. If a foreign party actively partakes in the
benefits of the United States by doing business there, it is only fair
that such a party be subject to all the burdens imposed by the United
States, including the inconvenience of broad discovery.
Extraterritorial discovery on equal terms has been suggested be-
80. See U.S. CoNsT. art. II, §§ 2-3.
81. See Laker II, 731 F.2d at 953-54:
It is permissible for courts to disengage when judicial scrutiny would implicate inher-
ently unreviewable actions, such as conduct falling within the act of state or sovereign
immunity doctrines. But both institutional limitations on the judicial process and
Constitutional restrictions make it unacceptable for the Judiciary to seize the political
initiative and determine that legitimate application of American laws must evaporate
when challenged by a foreign jurisdiction.
82. See RESTATEMENT (THiRD) FOREIGN RELATIONS § 442 (1986); Teitelbaum, supra
note 18, at 875-76; Beyond the Rhetoric, supra note 18, at 106-08; Levarda, supra note 18, at
1394-95.
83. See, e.g., Teitelbaum, supra note 18, at 875-76.
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fore, but with one caveat: that sanctions for non-production be lim-
ited to findings of fact against the non-producing party if that party in
good faith attempted to comply with the order for production but was
prevented from doing so by a foreign government's threat of civil or
criminal penalties. 4 The problem with such limited sanctions is that
they will promote fairness only in the event of non-production of an
already known piece of evidence. Thus, if the foreign party fails to
produce in good faith, that party will be sanctioned by acting as if the
evidence had been produced." But what if the information sought is
only "reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible
evidence"?" Without already knowing exactly what one is looking
for, a finding of fact is meaningless. This Note therefore proposes
that sanctions for non-production imposed on foreign parties should
be certain, significant, and on the same terms as they would be im-
posed on domestic non-producers, regardless of the existence of a
blocking statute.
The argument against the use of equal sanctions is that courts
should not order parties to do the impossible, and that blocking stat-
utes make production impossible by creating the possibility of civil or
criminal penalties. Giving credence to this argument will only lead to
a stalemate: The United States will order discovery and in response
foreign nations will make compliance "impossible"; evidence will
never be discovered. Instead, impossibility should be interpreted in
its literal sense-something is impossible only if it physically cannot
be done-in order for any form of direct discovery to work. If a
party truly cannot produce the requested information, no sanction
should be issued. However, blocking statutes do not make produc-
tion impossible, but merely more inconvenient.
Furthermore, if there is to be a real solution to the extraterrito-
rial discovery problem, it must be crafted not by the judiciary but by
the executive. Foreign relations is the special province of the execu-
84. See generally Browne, supra note 18. This idea is at the heart of the bifurcation analy-
sis: Order discovery and then if there is non-compliance, punish with sanctions based on good
faith.
85. See Rogers, 357 U.S. 212-213 ("It may be that in a trial on the merits, petitioner's in-
ability to produce specific information will prove a serious handicap in dispelling doubt the
Government might be able to inject into the case. It may be that in the absence of complete
disclosure by petitioner, the District Court would be justified in drawing inferences unfavorable
to petitioner as to particular events.").
86. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
87. See Laitram Corp. v. Hale, 438 So.2d 269, 272 (La. Ct. App. La. 1983) (interpreting
Rogers as permitting severe sanctions even if there is "actual inability" to comply).
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tive and only the executive has the perspective necessary to accom-
modate all implicated interests." In a speech to the South Carolina
Bar Association in Columbia, South Carolina on May 5, 1984, then
Secretary of State George Schultz addressed the problem of extrater-
ritorial application of U.S. law in general terms and specifically sin-
gled out the problem of foreign statutes blocking U.S. discovery,
stressing the role of the executive branch in the solution.9 He pro-
posed four goals, uniquely within the executive's power: (1) to re-
solve policy differences with foreign nations via diplomacy; (2) to
make international agreements based on comity; (3) to improve co-
ordination within the U.S. government towards the goal of a more
consistent foreign policy; and (4) to work out more bilateral and mul-
tilateral mechanisms for notice, consultation, and cooperation.'
At least in the limited area of antitrust, the executive branch has
already laid a foundation for such a diplomatic solution by passing
the International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of 1994."'
The Act's stated purpose is to "facilitate obtaining foreign-located
antitrust evidence by authorizing the Attorney General of the United
States and the Federal Trade Commission to provide, in accordance
with antitrust mutual assistance agreements, antitrust evidence to
foreign antitrust authorities on a reciprocal basis."' Nonetheless,
more should be done.
The U.S. government has a duty to either equally enforce the
right to broad discovery or revoke it. If the executive decides not to
subject foreign parties to broad discovery, it should likewise not sub-
ject domestic parties to it. Many people would consider such a scal-
ing back of the discovery process to be a vast improvement. Re-
gardless, if broad discovery is retained, its application should be
uniform.
This proposal will place a significant burden on parties subject to
foreign blocking statutes,' but this is not necessarily an unfortunate
outcome. These parties chose to do business in the United States,
and by virtue of that decision, submitted themselves to the burdens
88. See U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 2-3.
89. Trade, Interdependence, and Conflicts of Jurisdiction, DEP'T OF STATE BULL, June
1984, at 33.
90. Id.
91. International Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 6201,6212 (1994).
92. Id. For background on this act, see News Conference with Attorney General Janet
Reno, Senator Howard Metzenbaum, Representative Jack Brooks, Assistant Attorney General
Anne Bingaman, Federal News Service, June 13,1994.
93. See Levarda, supra note 18, at 1391.
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imposed by the United States. 4 The implications of broad discovery
should have been considered in the initial decision to do business in
the United States.
Moreover, this proposal will place the burden on the "lowest
cost avoider." The foreign party is the only party with significant ties
to both countries and is thus in the best position to encourage both
countries to come to some sort of meaningful resolution to the over-
all problem of extraterritorial discovery. This scenario was predicted
by the court in Uranium Antitrust.
The order will serve to declare [the requesting party's] right to the
discovery it seeks, thereby framing the competing interests of the
United States and the foreign governments on a plane where the
potential moderation of the exercise of their conflicting enforce-
ment jurisdictions can be meaningfully considered. We do not seek
to force any defendant to violate foreign law. But we do seek to
make each defendant feel the full measure of each sovereign's con-
flicting commands....95
Strict and equal enforcement of the U.S. discovery laws is the
only solution to the extraterritorial discovery problem. It will ensure
fair treatment for all litigants in U.S. courts and will promote a much
needed foreign policy solution.
Karen A. Feagle
94. See First Nat'l City Bank, 271 F.2d at 620 ("If the Bank cannot, as it were, serve two
masters and comply with the lawful requirements both of the United States and of Panama,
perhaps it should surrender to one sovereign or the other the privileges received therefrom.");
see also Richmark Corp. v. Timber Falling Consultants, 959 F.2d 1468,1478-79 (9th Cir. 1992):
In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful of the difficulties foreign corpora-
tions face in doing business in the United States, nor of the rather delicate nature of
relations between sovereign states. We sincerely hope that today's decision will not
adversely affect the cordial business relationship between the United States and the
PRC. However, international business requires the accommodation of different legal
climates. Just as United States companies doing business in the PRC must expect to
abide by PRC law, when Beijing availed itself of business opportunities in this country
it undertook an obligation to comply with the lawful orders of United States courts.
95. Uranium Antitrust, 480 F. Supp. at 1156; see also Laker II, 731 F.2d at 955 ("Granting
recognition to this form of coercion will only retard the growth of international mechanisms
necessary to resolve satisfactorily the problems generated when radically divergent national
policies intersect in an area of concurrent jurisdiction.").
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